Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Political economists study voting in committees.
2 A prominent example is voting in monetary policy committees (MPCs) . 3 Voting disagreements in MPCs usually relate to disagreements on how to design monetary policy such as interest rate proposals. Scholars examine why MPC members disagree and whether preference heterogeneity influences monetary policy.
Determinants of dissent voting include members' internal and external status, career background, and the political channel of their appointment.
Studies on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decision-making show that
career background and the political channel of appointment influenced the voting behavior of the council members (e.g. Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990 , Chappell et al. 1993 , Chappell et al. 2005 ). Democrat appointees exhibited very different voting behavior to Republican appointees (Chappell et al. 1993) . Members of the German Bundesbank, too, seem to have voted for monetary policies favoring the parties which had nominated them in the pre-election period (Vaubel 1993 , 1997a , 1997b , Berger and Woitek 1997 . 4 Using data for eleven European countries, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) show that the career background of central bank council members has influenced their inflation targets: former union leaders and politicians are the most inflation-prone group. Belke and von Schnurbein (2012) examine the voting power of individual members of the ECB Governing Council. Berger et al. (2008) investigate the determinants of monetary policy committee size. Berger and Nitsch (2011) investigate how the size of monetary policy committees influences monetary policy. 4 The results by Berger and Neugart (2011) show that the political leaning of German state governments influenced the appointment of judges in labor courts. 5 By contrast, career background and the political channel of appointment hardly influenced the voting behavior of the council members of the Bank of England (Harris et al. 2011 ). The results obtained by Besley et al. (2008) show that there is preference for heterogeneity among MPC members at the Bank of England. However, members are not differentiated "according to their internal/external status, academic background, or experience in the Treasury" (p. 223). For a detailed account of preference heterogeneity between MPC members in Hungary and Poland and the FOMC, the Bank of England and Swedish Riksbank see also Jung and Kiss (2012) on how the views held by economists can differ). The opinions on economic policy-making used to correlate with policy preferences (Alston et al. 1992 , Fuchs et al. 1998 , Mayer 2001 , Klein and Stern 2006 , Gordon and Dahl 2013 . 6 As compared to MPC committees, the members of the German Council of Economic Experts all have the same professional background. Differences in voting behavior in the German Council of Economic Experts may thus be more aligned with political ideology than professional background.
In this paper I study the voting patterns of members of the German Council of Economic Experts with a view to determining why views on policy differ. There are two competing hypotheses: either the coalitions on different votes are non-systematic in terms of membership, indicating differences in professional opinion based on idiosyncratic aspects of the proposed policies; or the coalitions are systematic and ideologically-based. If voting reveals that the coalitions are systematic and ideologically-based, voting could be regarded as expressive and as a means of confirming identity.
I investigate the relation between the source of nomination of Council members and whether members vote with the majority and minority. I find that members nominated by the 6 Advising politicians appears to be influential in getting ideology-induced views implemented in real policymaking. Of course, economists may also have other motivations when advising politicians. Policy advice, for example, may be purely instrumental and benevolent; in other words given purely with a view to solving problems. Economists advising politicians and entrepreneurs are also likely to maximize their own utility by providing results that favour their clients (Kirchgässner 1996 (Kirchgässner , 1999 (Kirchgässner , 2005 (Kirchgässner , 2011 (Kirchgässner and 2012 Rülke (2012) . 9 The government originally intended to have three economics professors and two practitioners in the Council: one practitioner nominated by the trade unions, and one practitioner nominated by the employers' association. I am grateful to Juergen Donges for this hint.
with the trade unions" and "nominated in consultation with the employers' association".
Previous members nominated by the trade unions include: Harald Koch (1964 -1969 ), Claus Köhler (1969 -1974 ), Gerhard Scherhorn (1974 -1979 ), Werner Glastetter (1979 -1982 , HansJürgen Krupp (1982 -1984 ), Dieter Mertens (1984 -1986 ), Rüdiger Pohl (1986 -1994 ), Wolfgang Franz (1994 -1999 , Jürgen Kromphardt (1999 -2004 ), and Peter Bofinger (2004 . Members nominated by the employers' association have been : Paul Binder (1964 -1968 ), Manfred Schäfers (1968 -1970 ), Armin Gutowski (1970 -1978 ), Horst Albach (1978 -1983 ), Ernst Helmstädter (1983 -1988 ), Ottmar Issing (1988 -1990 ), Horst Siebert (1991 -2003 ), and Wolfgang Franz (2003 .
The council members are generally appointed for a period of five years.
Reappointment is possible. They elect one chairman for three years. Over the period 1963-2011, the German Council of Economic Experts has had 37 members. The average member served for 8.5 years.
Minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts
In 1971 Table 1 lists the individual council members since 1964, shows the period they have served and the number of minority votes that they cast.
Council members can submit minority votes on several individual issues of the final report of the German Council of Economic Experts. These descriptive statistics show that being nominated by the trade unions has a strong positive influence on submitting a minority vote.
Examples of dissent include labor market policies and fiscal policies: council members nominated by the trade unions do not balk at introducing comprehensive minimum wages and prefer a larger government. 
Econometric model
I specify a probit model of the following form:
with i = 1,...,31; j=1,2 ; k=1,...,6
where Minority vote it describes the voting behavior of council member i in year t and assumes the value one when council member i submitted a minority vote in year t and zero otherwise. Union Ticket it describes a dummy variable that assumes the value one when council member i was nominated by the trade unions. Employers Ticket it describes a dummy variable that assumes the value one when council member i was nominated by the employers´ association. Σ j δ j micro ijt describes other personal characteristic variables of council member i. [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] ). An alternative minority position coding does not consider Helmut Hesse to be in the minority. Inferences do not change using this alternative minority position coding. One expert suggested that only the Council members nominated by the trade unions have always been in a minority position. Elaborating on this view means that the union ticket and the minority position variable are identical. I have also used the nomination by a left-wing/right-wing government to identify whether an individual council member was in a minority. However, many of the members remained on the council for a number of years, even in cases where the government changed meaning that the new government did not replace potentially ideology-induced council members. Being nominated by a left-wing or right-wing government therefore does not appear to correctly label an individual member as being left-wing or right-wing. 11 I consider the periods 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2011. 12 I do not include Dieter Mertens in 1985 because he was sick when the council members voted on the report. Table 3 shows the regression results of the coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is coded such that minority votes take on the value one and voting with the majority of the council members takes on the value zero. Positive coefficients of the explanatory variables thus mean that the explanatory variable induces a positive influence on submitting a minority vote and vice versa. Column (1) shows the results without control variables. In column (2), I
Results

Basic results
have included the age variable and the macro economist dummy variable as basic personal characteristic control variables. In column (3), I have also included the minority position variable. Column (4) and (5) present the results when the macroeconomic control variables are included (with and without the minority position variable). Column (6) and (7) present the results when also the decadal dummy variables are included (with and without the minority position variable).
The age variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (3), at the 10% level in column (4), at the 5% level in column (5), and lacks statistical significance in columns (6) and (7). This effect indicates that older council members have proven somewhat more likely to submit minority votes in the past. The macroeconomist variable, the minority position variable, the unemployment rate and real GDP growth do not turn out to be statistically significant. The left-wing federal government variable is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (4) The results in Table 3 show that being nominated by the trade unions has a positive influence on submitting a minority vote: the coefficient of the Union Ticket variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (7). The Employers Ticket variable also has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1), (2) and (4), and at the 1% level in columns (3), (5), (6) and (7). Based on the coefficient estimates, we can calculate the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of submitting a minority vote. Table 4 shows the change in probability of submitting a minority vote when an individual council member has been nominated by the trade unions or the employers' association (I evaluate the marginal effects at the mean of the covariates). The results in Table 4 indicate that for a council member nominated by the trade unions, the probability of submitting a minority vote increases by about 70 percentage points, and that for a council member nominated by the employers´ association, the probability of Table 4 : Marginal Effects. Union Ticket and Employers Ticket on minority votes.
Referring to Table 3. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Robustness Tests
I have checked the robustness of the results in several ways. I have replaced the binary dependent variable with a dependent variable that considers the number of minority votes.
Because the dependent variable includes an excessive number of zeros, I have estimated a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model with robust standard errors. The zeroinflated model distinguishes two processes: an individual council member submits minority votes or not (modeled by a logit model), and if s/he submits minority votes, the model considers the number of minority votes (modeled by a negative binomial model). The zeroinflated negative binomial models show that in cases where a council member has been nominated by the trade unions and submitted minority votes, the predicted number of additional minority votes per year is positive, but tiny. In cases where a council member has been nominated by the employers' association and submitted minority votes, the predicted number of additional minority votes per year does not turn out to be statistically significant.
I have tested whether voting behavior depends on whether a council member has initially been nominated by a left-wing or right-wing federal government and have therefore included a variable that assumes the value one for a left-wing government, the value 0.5 when left-wing and right-wing parties formed a coalition government ("Grosse Koalition") and zero when the council member has initially been nominated by a right-wing government. 13 The coefficient of this variable has a positive sign, but lacks statistical significance. Including this 13 My coding refers to the government that was in power when an individual council member joined the Council. In cases where an individual council member joined the council some months after a change in government occurred, one may well want to employ an alternative coding that takes into account the party alignment of the government that initially nominated a council member. There are four cases to be considered. Hillman (2010) proposes that expressive voting is a category of low-cost acts that enable individuals to confirm their identity to themselves and to others. Confirming identity to others is best achieved when voting is visible rather than anonymous. Hillman (2010) also proposes that expressive voting can result in an expressive policy trap whereby a majority of voters has voted for a policy that each voter 14 I have also included the inflation rate that does not turn out to be statistically significant and including it does not change the inferences regarding the Union Ticket and Employers Ticket variable. 15 A proposed solution to the paradox of voting (Downs 1957 ) is that voting is expressive (Buchanan 1954 , Tullock 1971 , Ursprung 1980 , Brennan and Lomasky 1993 , Brennan and Hamlin 2000 , Drinkwater and Jennings 2007 , Glazer 2008 , Hillman 2010 , Hamlin and Jennings 2011 , Jennings 2013 . The expressive voting hypothesis has been set in two alternative motivations. Brennan and Lomasky (1993) and Brennan and Hamlin (2000) , and other formulations, describe expressive voting using the analogy of expressing support for a sports team. 16 Majority voting could also be expressive. Minority votes would reflect expressive behavior to a greater extent because minority votes are more visible. For example, the media report on minority voting in the German Council of Economic Experts, but they do not report about majority voting.
would veto individually if s/he were able to do so. The expressive policy trap is implicit in Tullock's observation (Tullock 1971 ) that individuals may support outcomes with the hope that they will be in the minority.
Even though expressing minority positions in the German Council of Economic
Experts is a suitable instrument for confirming the one's identity it is not so that the members of the minority only take their minority positions when they know that they will be in the minority and their policy advice will not influence policy. 17 In general, the members of the Council base their policy advice on pro-market positions that emphasize the role of incentives in economic behavior. The members nominated by the trade unions have different policy preferences and express their views regardless of whether they are in the minority or not.
17 There is no evidence that the German government implemented policies based on a minority position or that a minority position became a majority position in the German Council of Economic Experts. Minority votes in committees may however become decisive. The results by Gerlach-Kristen (2004) show that the voting record of the monetary policy committee in the United Kingdom helped to predict future monetary policy changes: "if a minority votes for a lower level of the repo rate than the rest of the committee, the MPC is more likely to loosen monetary policy at the next meeting than to raise rates" (p. 312).
